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In this paper we test different theories on debt maturity that can be ascribed to either 
the demand or the supply side of the market. Firm risk, asymmetric information, agency 
costs are all aspects that should be considered in the analysis. We also include leverage in 
the firm decision process regarding debt maturity, relying on a simultaneous equations 
approach. Among Italian industrial firms, theories based on lenders using debt maturity to 
address information problems and default risk seem to have strong explanatory power. The 
demand side of the market appears to be less important in determining debt maturity. The 
role of the supply side of the market is confirmed when considering legal enforcement of 
loan contracts. Where legal enforcement is low, the negative consequences of asymmetric 
information are worse for lenders and this explains why they give more importance to 
asymmetric information proxies in determining debt maturity.  
JEL classification: G32, K40, L14. 
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 1. Introduction
1 
Italian firms rely less on long-term financial debt than companies in other countries. 
Using the comprehensive source of Financial Accounts, the evidence is that in the recent 
past the share of long-term financial debt has increased in Italy from 42 per cent in 1995 to 
52 per cent in 2003, but is still lower than in the euro-area countries (67 per cent). Table 1 
shows that even normalised to GDP the share of long-term debt is far lower in Italy than in 
the euro-area average. Further, debt maturity is shorter for small and young firms and for 
those with fewer tangible assets (Table 2).
2   
The aim of this paper is to analyse the debt maturity choice of Italian firms. More 
precisely, the analysis is aimed at sorting out supply and demand explanations of the 
equilibrium value of debt maturity. On the demand side, a financial structure excessively 
tilted towards short-term debt may have some negative effects. Short-term debt matures 
before investment cash flow and must be refinanced. This gives more control to lenders, who 
may liquidate projects too often from the borrowers’ point of view; this creates a liquidity 
risk (Diamond, 1991a). The firm’s choice for debt maturity actually trades off between this 
cost of short-term debt and some advantages. Short-term debt is often less expensive. 
Further, as argued in Diamond (1991a), firms with unfavourable information on their 
projects decide to mimic the choice for short-term debt made by firms with favourable 
information (and therefore less subject to liquidity risk) to avoid being singled out by the 
lender. Finally, short-term debt can reduce the conflict of interests (i.e. agency costs) 
between shareholders and creditors, which can create an under-investment problem (Myers, 
1977); this problem is emphasised for firms with high growth opportunities.  
                                                            
1 I wish to thank Marcello Bofondi, Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti, Riccardo De Bonis, Andrea Generale, Silvia 
Giacomelli, Luigi Guiso, Sérgio Lagoa, Alberto Franco Pozzolo, Luigi Federico Signorini, Giovanni Verga, 
two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy (2003), at the 9
th conference of 
Portuguese Society for Research in Economics (Lisbona, 2004) and at the International Economic Association 
(Marrakech, 2005) for helpful comments. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not 
involve the responsibility of the Bank of Italy. All remaining errors are mine.  
2 Financial Accounts consider as long-term debt that with original maturity of more than one year. Data in 
Table 2 refer to the Company Account Database, the data used throughout the paper and based on residual 
maturity.  8  
From a lender’s perspective, short-term debt is useful because it allows monitoring of 
firms and helps to reduce their misbehaviour with the threat of non-renewal of the loan 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). These functions are particularly important under 
information asymmetries that create adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Debt 
maturity is therefore recognised as an instrument for coping with unknown and riskier 
customers. Among others, Diamond (1991b) argued that monitoring is important for 
reducing information asymmetries and screening moral hazard. However, monitoring is a 
costly task for lenders and should be used less often when either asymmetric information is 
less relevant or the firm is less risky.  
Considering these different features of the demand and supply sides of the market, 
corporate finance theories, under brief review in Section 2, predict that some firm 
characteristics, which could be seen as proxies for asymmetric information, firm risk and 
agency costs, may actually have important effects on the equilibrium value of debt maturity. 
In the empirical part of the paper we test these theoretical predictions for Italian industrial 
firms. Overall, debt maturity has been less empirically studied than other indicators of the 
composition of financial resources, such as leverage (Ravid, 1996); this is particularly true 
for Italian companies whose leverage has been studied, among others, in Sapienza (1997) 
and Staderini (2001). Further, as clearly stated by Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2005), most of 
the papers have adopted as a reference theories mainly concerned with the demand side of 
the market, i.e. which debt maturity is preferred by firms, rather than considering the fact 
that lenders may have strong bargaining power in choosing debt maturity.  
In order to improve our assessment of the importance of supply considerations in 
determining debt maturity, we conclude our empirical analysis by testing the effect of 
dissimilar legal enforcement of loan contracts in different areas of the country. Judicial 
efficiency matters for the composition of financial resources. Actually, financing is 
essentially based on information about the borrower available to outside investors. 
Nonetheless, financing is also linked to the enforcement of the lenders’ right to repossess the 
money in the event of the borrower’s default. Legal enforcement actually determines what 
rights lenders have and how well they are protected. We argue that a worse enforcement of 
loan contracts may have an effect mainly on the supply side of the market. When the legal  9  
system is inefficient, asymmetric information is more pervasive and hence adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems are more insidious.  
The recent strand of law and economics literature (La Porta et al, 1997 and 1998) has 
shed light on these aspects. More explicitly on debt maturity, in a recent paper Diamond 
(2004) argues that if enforcement costs are large and creditor protection is weak, then 
lenders rely more heavily on short-term debt. Essentially, short-term debt, which is subject to 
“firms’ runs”, can serve to commit multiple lenders to enforce their claims, providing costly 
ex-post punishment to borrowers as well as beneficial ex-ante incentives. The poorer the 
judicial efficiency the greater the use of short-term debt.  
However, in this paper we do not analyse the direct impact of judicial efficiency on 
debt maturity choice. An analysis based only on the direct effect implies the assumption that 
a worsening in the efficiency of justice has a homogenous effect on all borrowers. We argue 
this could not be the case. An increase in the inefficiency of justice may actually heighten 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems, which are likely to matter more for highly 
opaque borrowers, i.e. borrowers more affected by asymmetric information. For these 
reasons, the focus of this paper is on the impact that legal enforcement has on the 
importance, in the debt maturity equation, of some firm characteristics, such as size, tangible 
assets and age, which are actually proxies of the extension of firm information asymmetries.     
This part of the paper is generally linked to the law and economics literature on this 
specific topic, which has indeed not reached clear-cut results. For a group of European 
countries, Giannetti  (2000) finds that return volatility and tangible assets matter more, 
respectively for debt maturity and for leverage, when creditor protection is less developed in 
a country. This result is different from that in Rajan and Zingales (1995), who work with a 
sample of public firms in some major industrialised countries: their tests on the importance 
of legal institutions for leverage are disappointing. For example, they argue that size is an 
important proxy for bankruptcy risk and should be less significant in determining leverage 
where legal rules offer better protection to creditors; however, the authors find this is not the 
case. Giannetti argues that the different findings in Rajan and Zingales (1995) stem from the 
fact that they work with a sample tilted towards very large firms, which do not really face an 
asymmetric information problem. Finally Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), who 
work with a sample of thirty developed and developing countries, find that improvements in  10 
legal rules seem to benefit essentially large firms as far as debt maturity is concerned. They 
argue this occurs because the smallest firms have limited access to the courts owing to the 
existence of some fixed costs; it is therefore likely that small firms can obtain more long-
term credit from improvements in the banking system rather than in the legal system.  
Italian firms represent an interesting case-study from this standpoint. Considering a 
specific country reduces the effects of several institutional differences that often blur the 
evidence of cross-country regressions, as in the empirical evidence mentioned above. The 
different areas of Italy are in fact subject to the same legal rules and bankruptcy code, but 
they show a wide variability in the degree of judicial efficiency (Figures 1 and 2). Further, in 
Italy there is a high concentration of small and opaque firms, which theories based on 
asymmetric information should be particularly suited to.  
As a preview of the results, we find that for Italian companies supply explanations 
appear to matter more than demand reasons in determining the equilibrium value of debt 
maturity. This result is reinforced by the evidence that for firms located in provinces where 
legal enforcement is worse, we observe an increase in the importance of some proxies of 
information asymmetries in the debt maturity equation. The interpretation we offer is that 
lenders assign more weight to these proxies when asymmetric information has a more 
pervasive effect, i.e. when the lender has a lower probability of recovering the loan in the 
case of default because of worse legal enforcement.  
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the main predictions on 
debt maturity from corporate finance theories. In Section 3 we outline the test concerning the 
indirect impact of legal enforcement on debt maturity. In Section 4 we describe in detail the 
estimation method used. In Section 5 we present the data. Sections 6 and 7 contain the 
results of the estimations, while Section 8 includes some robustness exercises. Section 9 
concludes.   11 
2. Testable predictions on debt maturity  
2.1 The impact of firm risk  
The first theoretical prediction considered in this section refers to firm risk. In the 
Diamond two-period model (1991a) firms have private information on the net present value 
(NPV) of their projects that could be either positive or negative; lenders do not share this 
information, but they can assign an initial risk-rating to the firm, based on some differences 
they can observe. Creditors learn during the period and may refuse to roll-over short-term 
debt at the end of the first period, thus creating a liquidity risk.
3 In this framework, higher-
rated borrowers with favourable private information prefer short-term debt because it is less 
expensive and they are likely to roll it over. Intermediate-rated firms with favourable private 
information use long-term debt to avoid the liquidity risk. This is true also for firms with 
unfavourable private information (NPV<0); the latter mimic the choice of firms with 
favourable information, otherwise creditors may identify them and deny credit (Berger et al, 
2005). Essentially, an increase in debt maturity with firm risk-rating, from low-risk to 
intermediate-risk firms, is driven by the preferences of the firms, i.e. the demand side of the 
market.  
Shifting the attention to low-rated firms, lenders may refuse to offer long-term debt to 
firms that are initially considered to be high-risk because they have a high probability of a 
negative NPV.  This result of the Diamond model is in line with the debt contracting 
literature, which has stressed that the most restrictive conditions of the loan contract are used 
with the high-risk borrowers, especially under asymmetric information (Berlin and Mester, 
1992). Simplifying, we can argue that for these borrowers the “debt covenant view of debt 
maturity”, i.e. the view that lenders have strong bargaining power in determining the 
maturity of loans, contrasts with the view that debt maturity is essentially chosen by the 
borrowers, which could be valid only for low-risk firms. On the whole, short-term debt with 
                                                            
3 The lender may liquidate the project too often from the borrower’s point of view, because he cannot 
exploit some rents obtainable only by the borrowers because of private information, moral hazard or 
monitoring costs, i.e. market imperfections (Diamond, 1991a). This creates a liquidity risk associated with 
short-term debt, i.e. the risk that a borrower will lose non-assignable rents due to excessive liquidation 
incentive by lenders. In other words, the liquidity risk could be seen as the risk that a solvent but illiquid 
borrower is unable to obtain refinancing.    12 
banks is the forced choice for high-risk borrowers. The negative relationship between debt 
maturity and firm risk-rating, from intermediate-risk to high-risk firms, is clearly influenced 
by the supply side of the market.  
Therefore, based on the Diamond model (1991a), the first prediction we test in the 
paper is that there should be a non-monotonic relationship between debt maturity and 
credit-rating.
 Debt-maturity should increase with risk-rating from low-risk to intermediate-
risk firms and then decrease with risk-rating among firms with higher risk. 
4 In the paper we 
consider the return volatility as a classical measure of firm risk. A rise in the volatility of 
earnings increases the probability and hence the cost of financial distress (Bradley, Jarrell 
and Kim, 1984). The empirical evidence has generally found a negative correlation between 
debt maturity and return volatility (Mauer and Stohs, 1996; Johnson, 2003). A more 
comprehensive indicator of firm risk is the score indicator, for which the empirical results 
are more mixed. There is some evidence of a non-monotonic relationship with score as 
predicted by Diamond (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Mauer and Stohs, 1996). Other studies find 
that rated firms find it easier to borrow long-term, such as Johnson (2003); similarly, Ortiz-
Molina and Penas (2005) get the result that firm owners that have been delinquent on 
personal obligations are granted loans with shorter maturity. By contrast, Berger et al. 
(2005), using loan issues rather than debt maturity structure, find that loan maturity appears 
to be an upward sloping function of firm risk-rating: they stress this finding is in contrast 
with the prediction of the Diamond model for high-risk firms.  
2.2 The impact of asymmetric information  
The second prediction we test in this paper is related to the asymmetric information 
theory. As mentioned in the Introduction, when there is wide asymmetric information 
between outsiders and insiders, lenders would rather use short-term debt so that they can 
                                                            
4 In the Flannery model (1986), where firms are initially observationally equivalent, the prediction is even 
stronger than in Diamond model. Firms with favourable private information demand short-term debt at a 
relatively low interest rate because they know they will have not problems in rolling it over; firms with 
unfavourable information are willing to pay high interest rates on long-term debt to avoid the high probability 
of paying higher rates in the second period. In this separating equilibrium creditors can infer some of the 
initially firm-specific private information and use it in assigning risk-rating, giving lower risk-rating to firms 
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better control the firm. With a shorter debt maturity lenders can avoid some incentive 
problems by refusing to renew the loan or modifying the terms of supply (Diamond, 1991a). 
This is particularly true for loans granted by banks, which can closely monitor their 
borrowers, unlike creditors that have bought bonds. Nonetheless, when asymmetric 
information weakens, lenders have an incentive to increase debt maturity in order to reduce 
monitoring costs.
5 The second empirical prediction is therefore that debt maturity should be 
positively influenced by firm size as well as tangible assets and age, which are usual proxies 
for the extension of information asymmetries. This is clearly a supply explanation of debt 
maturity choice.  
More specifically, the theory is unambiguous in its prediction for the firm’s size. 
Because a large firm is less subject to asymmetric information, lenders should be more 
willing to grant long-term debt as they are supposed to be less in need of a strict monitoring. 
The empirical findings support the positive correlation between size and debt maturity 
(Barclay and Smith, 1995; Mauer and Stohs, 1996; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Enria, 1999). 
In a similar vein, tangible assets or collateral may convey information to investors about the 
quality of the firm and reduce the degree of information asymmetries or opaqueness 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004); moreover, in the case of default, if a firm has 
more tangible assets to be used as collateral, lenders incur smaller losses. Therefore, an 
increase in assets that can be offered to lenders as collateral should increase long-term debt. 
Likewise, age reduces a firm’s information asymmetries and the need for monitoring.
6 
Therefore, lenders should be more willing to supply long-term credit to older firms; an 
increase in age should be reflected in a rising share of long-term debt. Nonetheless, this 
variable has seldom been used in previous empirical works on debt maturity. Enria (1999) 
finds different signs for the coefficient of firm age among European countries. The evidence 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
that choose short-term debt and higher risk-rating to firms that choose long-term debt. Therefore debt maturity 
is predicted to be always positively linked to risk-rating.  
5 Banks may also use debt covenants for monitoring and for discipline; however, covenants are harder to 
enforce when dealing with small and opaque firms. So with the latter borrowers, for which asymmetric 
information is more pervasive, debt maturity is optimal as it allows more frequent renegotiations and close 
monitoring. When asymmetric information weakens, lenders can use covenants or other terms for monitoring 
(Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2005). 
6 According to Diamond (1991b) higher reputation, connected with age, reduces the need for monitoring 
because it alone can reduce moral hazard. Nonetheless, where a developed bond market exists, ageing firms 
may rely more on public placed short-term debt; therefore, short-term debt may also increase with age.   14 
in Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2005), concerning small firms in the US, is that age is positively 
related to debt maturity of the new lines of credit. 
2.3  The impact of agency costs  
As already mentioned, short-term debt entails a liquidity risk for the borrower, i.e. the 
risk that the borrower cannot refinance the debt. Nonetheless, on the demand side of the 
market there could be a rational in preferring short-term debt, as put forward by the agency 
costs theory. The agency costs theory hinges on imperfect information concerning managers’ 
future attitudes, when incomplete contracts do not allow the moral hazard problems to be 
fully tackled. Conflicts of interest may arise both between different categories of 
shareholders and between shareholders and creditors. The optimal capital structure should 
minimise the agency costs deriving from the different conflicts of interest (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
Specifically for debt maturity, Myers (1977) points out a serious agency problem 
between shareholders and creditors. If the firm has the option of taking future investment 
opportunities, the existence of debt that matures after the option expires may, in some states 
of nature, induce managers, acting in the shareholders’ interest, to pass-up some profitable 
investment projects because shareholders cannot obtain a positive return. This is the so-
called under-investment problem, which could be solved by shortening debt maturity.
7 Debt 
that matures before  an investment option can be exercised does not induce sub-optimal 
investment decisions.
8 The third prediction tested in the paper is that debt maturity should 
decrease when managerial discretion in choosing investment is greater. Therefore, debt 
maturity should be negatively correlated with higher opportunities for growth, as managers 
of these firms may have more discretion in choosing among different investment projects. 
                                                            
7 Essentially, the problem is that without outstanding debt (creditors), the investment option is worth 
exercising if V(s)-I>=0,where V(s) is the worth of the firm’s assets at time t=1 and I is the investment. With 
outstanding debt maturing after the option expires, the investment is made if V(s)-I-P>=0 where P is the 
promised payment to creditors. The area under which the investment option is exercised is then reduced. In the 
case of V(s)-P<I, shareholders’ outlay I will exceed the market value of their shares and the investment option 
could not be exercised. If the debt matures before the option expires, the disincentive to invest is eliminated; in 
this case, if V(s)-I<P the bondholders will take over and will exercise the firm’s option to invest if V(S)>=I. 
8 Other solutions are to reduce the presence of creditors and use restrictive covenants, which for example 
oblige managers to undertake all the projects with positive net present value.  15 
On this last point, the literature has found it difficult to obtain a good proxy for growth 
opportunities. A variable often used is the ratio between market and book value of the firm’s 
assets.
9 In this paper, as we do not have the market value for equity, we follow the empirical 
literature (Giannetti, 2000) in using as proxy for growth opportunities the growth rate of 
sales between t and t+1 at sector level. The empirical evidence is mixed on this point. 
Barclay and Smith (1995) find that smaller firms with more growth opportunities (measured 
as the market-to-book ratio) have indeed a lower share of long-term debt. On the contrary, 
using a similar indicator, the evidence in Mauer and Stohs (1996) is that debt maturity does 
not decrease when growth opportunities increase: they argue that this occurs because firms 
with high growth options have lower leverage (i.e. low debt compared with capital) and 
therefore little incentive to minimise conflicts of interests between shareholders and creditors 
using debt maturity. Mauer and Stohs control for leverage in the maturity equation, but 
without considering its nature as endogenous variable. Johnson (2003), considering that 
maturity and leverage are chosen simultaneously, finds support for Myers’s prediction that 
using short-term debt diminishes the negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage.  
2.4 The impact of leverage  
In the estimations carried out in this paper we include leverage in the maturity equation 
and we consider that it could be chosen jointly with debt maturity (see Section 4 for the 
estimation procedure). As for the relationship between leverage and debt maturity, on the 
grounds of past evidence the results are not clear-cut. On the demand side, an increase in 
leverage is reflected in a higher liquidity risk, which firms should alleviate with more long-
term debt (Diamond, 1991a; Mauer and Stohs, 1996, Giannetti, 2000). However, on the 
supply side some lenders may turn down applications for long-term debt because of the 
higher risk that an increasing leverage entails: in this case the relationship between leverage 
and debt maturity could be negative (Enria, 1999). The fourth prediction to be tested is that 
if a supply explanation prevails, leverage should negatively affect debt maturity. 
                                                            
9 The market value of assets is generally estimated as the book value of assets plus the difference between 
the market and book values of equity. Several authors argue that the more growth opportunities a firm has, the 
larger the ratio is, as the market value also prices the exercise of growth options (Mauer and Stohs, 1996).  16 
2.5  The impact of the asset maturity  
Finally, another classical determinant of debt maturity is the maturity of firm’s assets, 
which clearly stands on the demand side of the market. Matching the length of assets and 
liabilities is an important task for a firm. On the one hand, if the debt is too short, the firm 
may not have the money to repay the principal and will need to refinance it, thus 
encountering a liquidity risk (Diamond, 1991a). On the other hand, if the debt has a longer 
maturity, the firm may fall short of the cash flow from assets it needs for debt repayment. 
The fifth empirical prediction to test is therefore that an increase in asset maturity implies 
longer debt maturity because of the matching theory.
10 The empirical evidence is generally 
consistent with this hypothesis. As in most other papers (Mauer and Stohs, 1996; Barclay, 
Marx and Smith, 2003; Johnson, 2003), firm asset maturity is measured as the weighted 
average of the maturity of current assets and of net property, plant and equipment. The 
maturity of current assets is measured as current assets divided by the value of goods sold, 
while the maturity of net property, plant and equipment is obtained dividing this amount by 
depreciations; these two ratios are weighted by the relative size of current assets and net 
property, plant and equipment.
11 
In summary, we finally estimate the following equation for debt maturity:  
(1)    
Debt maturity assmat size collateral age risk
growth options leverage dtime darea dindustries
it it it it it it
tor t it t i i it
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−− −−
+
β β β β β β
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The dependent variable is the ratio between long-term financial debts (maturing in 
more than one year and using residual maturity) and total financial debts.
12  For the precise 
definition of the other variables see Table 3, while darea stands for area dummies, dtime  
                                                            
10 Further, Myers (1977) states that matching the maturity of assets and liabilities can reduce agency 
conflicts between shareholders and creditors by ensuring that debt repayments are scheduled to correspond with 
the decline in the value of assets in place. 
11 As argued in Mauer and Stohs (1996), the rational for this indicator is that current assets, like inventory, 
supports production measured by its value. Further, straight-line depreciations of long-term assets, which are 
used in the balance sheet, provide a better approximation of economic depreciation than do accelerated 
depreciations that firms use for tax purposes. 
12 Trade debt (account payables) is excluded from the definition of financial debt and hence is not included 
in short-term debt.  17 
for year dummies, which should also capture changes in the relative cost of short-term 
versus long-term debt, and  s dindustrie for sector dummies.  
3. The test using legal enforcement and asymmetric information proxies 
The purpose of this section is to explain why and how we rely on a test related to the 
quality of legal enforcement in order to assess our understanding of the importance of supply 
considerations in determining the equilibrium value of debt maturity.  
When the quality of judicial efficiency worsens, legal enforcement of loan contracts is 
weaker. Lenders therefore have a greater need to monitor borrowers and would like to use 
more short-term debt. However, this effect should be stronger for borrowers who are more 
affected by asymmetric information problems.  In other words, when the legal system is 
inefficient, adverse selection and moral hazard problems matter more and so does the 
asymmetric information that is at the origin of these problems. Hence the proxies for 
asymmetric information should have greater importance for the lenders in choosing debt 
maturity when legal enforcement is low.  
Our test therefore consists in assessing whether size, tangible assets and age, the usual 
proxies for the extensions of firm asymmetric information, matter more when the quality of 
judicial efficiency worsens. As the expected impact of the asymmetric information proxies 
on debt maturity is positive (Section 2), essentially our test on the sign of this cross partial 
derivative is: 







where AI stands for asymmetric information proxies, such as firm size, tangible assets and 
age, and justice for the quality of judicial efficiency. As justice is a measure of the length of 
civil trials (see Section 5 for details), an increase in justice reflects a worsening in the quality 
of judicial efficiency.   18 
4.The estimation strategy  
4.1  A simultaneous equation framework for debt maturity and leverage  
In the estimations carried out in this paper we include leverage in the debt maturity 
equation. Following Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003) and Johnson (2003), we consider the 
particular nature of leverage as a choice variable jointly with debt maturity. The different 
decisions about corporate finance, such as the firm’s choice between equity or debt, debt 
maturity, debt priority and covenants, are likely to be taken simultaneously. In particular, it 
is highly unlikely that the decision for debt maturity is taken separately from that concerning 
leverage. In order to estimate a debt maturity equation, we therefore consider a system of 
two simultaneous equations, one for debt maturity and the other for leverage. The system is 
estimated using a two-stage least square. In the second stage, in the maturity equation the 
predicted value of leverage is included, rather than its actual value; the predicted value is 
obtained by regressing, in a first-stage regression, leverage on all the exogenous variables of 
the system.
13 
 The theory suggests that leverage and debt maturity decisions are roughly driven by 
similar firm characteristics. However, this type of estimation requires some exclusion 
restrictions from the theory in order to identify the structural coefficients (Greene, 2003).
 In 
line with some previous empirical studies (Barclay, Marx and Smith, 2003; Johnson, 2003), 
we estimate the system of two equations using the following exclusion restrictions. We 
include  only  in the debt maturity equations the explanatory variable concerning asset 
maturity, which should not affect leverage. Conversely, we include only  in the leverage 
equations the explanatory variable measuring the non-debt tax shield (depreciations on total 
assets), which should matter only for leverage; if there are alternative ways, such as 
                                                            
13 Using just a reduced-form regression for debt maturity from the system of equation, i.e. considering only 
exogenous variables in the right-hand side and therefore excluding endogenous leverage from the maturity 
equation, implies that changing one of the exogenous variables can have a direct effect on maturity and an 
indirect effect through leverage. If the theory implies these effects are reinforcing, then the theory has some 
unambiguous predictions for reduced-form regression coefficients. On the contrary, if the two effects are 
offsetting and the theory cannot predict their relative size, we do not have predictions that are testable using 
reduced-form regressions. However, even if the reduced-form coefficients do not yield unambiguous 
predictions, the theory can still be tested using the structural-equation regressions (Barclay, Marx and Smith, 
2003).  19 
depreciations, which can be used to reduce the tax burden, leverage is less attractive for this 
purpose. Taxes should have an effect on leverage, but not on maturity decisions (Barclay, 
Marx and Smith, 2003). Further, profits are included only in the leverage equation because, 
according to the pecking-order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), profits 
should be negatively linked to firm leverage; on the other hand, there is no theory asserting 
an explanatory power of profits for debt maturity (Johnson, 2003). This is basically the 
identification strategy used in this paper.
14 Given these exclusion restrictions, the system of 
two equations is identified and can be estimated by two-stage least square (Johnson, 2003).
15  
Unlike previous empirical studies, as the share of long-term debt is between 0 and 1, 
we rely on both the Tobit model (censored dependent variable) and a model where the 
dependent variable is transformed in log-odds in order to have a variable that spans all real 
values.
16 We estimate an unbalanced panel made up of around 68,000 firm-year observations 
(roughly 14,900 firms) that controls for firm heterogeneity and allows us to consider the 
hypothesis that the errors are not independent within the firm. For the Tobit model, we 
estimate a panel random-effect model, which assumes the unobserved individual effects as 
uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables. For the estimation in log-odds, we are also 
able to estimate a panel fixed-effect model, which allows the unobserved individual effects 
to be correlated with the other explanatory variables, though exploiting only time-series 
variability.
17  
                                                            
14 In other words, we want to have only an exogenous variation in leverage. Therefore, we instrument it 
with some variables that are strongly correlated with leverage, while they should not with the error term 
(unobserved factors) in the debt maturity equation. 
15 Unlike other studies, we keep in the maturity equation the variable tangible assets, which should control 
for the firm’s ability to offer collateral to the lender. The rational is that the ability to provide collateral should 
matter for the lender as it reduces the opacity of the borrower and therefore the need for monitoring that 
induces lenders to use short-term debt. 
16 Before the transformation of the share y in log-odds z, i.e. z=log(y/(1-y)) with z unbounded, we replace 
shares equal to 0 with the lowest share and shares equal to 1 with the highest share in the distribution. 
Sensitivity analysis has been carried out in order to check the results when substituting different values for 0 
and 1. 
17 The random-effect panel model may suffer from inconsistency if the assumption of the absence of 
correlation between regressors and unobserved individual effect is not satisfied (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). 
Even if some authors have proposed fixed-effect Tobit panel models, their estimation is still tricky. In this 
paper, on the basis of the similarity of the results between the estimations using Tobit and log-odds, we prefer 
to verify the results using the panel fixed-effect estimation with the dependent variable transformed in log-
odds.   20 
In order to avoid simultaneity problems, all the explanatory variables in the equation 
(1) are lagged one period; they are therefore treated as predetermined variables (i.e. not 
correlated with the current error term), except the firm return volatility, which is fixed in the 
period under analysis; the growth opportunities proxy, which is measured by the growth rate 
of sales between t and t+1 at a sector level; and the score, for which the contemporaneous 
value is used (see Section 5).  
4.2 The implementation of the test on legal enforcement  
In order to implement test (2) mentioned above, first we create interaction terms using 
the efficiency of justice measured as a continuous variable. We therefore interact the proxies 
for AI (size, tangible assets and age) with justice measured in length. In this case the test (2) 
is clearly implemented. The coefficients of the interaction terms are an indication of the 
second cross partial derivative of debt maturity with respect to the proxies of AI and to the 
efficiency of justice. Under the expected case of a positive impact of the variable measuring 
AI on debt maturity, this second derivative is expected to be positive (test in 2); i.e. when the 
inefficiency of justice increases, the first partial derivative of debt maturity with respect to 
the firm’s characteristic is expected to be higher.  
For the sake of testing the robustness of the results concerning the impact of worse 
legal enforcement, we also create interaction terms between, respectively, size, tangible 
assets and age with dummies for the efficiency of justice, rather than using a continuous 
variable. Two interaction terms are defined. The former is obtained by interacting the 
variables with a dummy equal to 1 when the length of the first-degree civil action is greater 
than the first quartile and lower than the median value. The latter is obtained by interacting 
the variables with a dummy that is equal to 1 when the length is over the median value; 
statistics on length are measured over the 95 Italian provinces.
18 The coefficient of the first 
interaction term therefore measures the increase in the base coefficient for firms located in 
                                                            
18 The sample which includes firms located in the Italian provinces where the length of civil actions is 
below the first quartile accounts for 27 per cent of all observations. The sample that included firms located in 
the provinces belonging between the first quartile and the median accounts for 42 per cent. The remaining 
sample includes all the companies facing a length of first-degree civil actions that is greater than the median 
value (31 per cent).   21 
the provinces where the length of actions is greater than the first quartile, but lower than the 
median value. The coefficient of the second interaction term makes it possible to obtain the 
change in the base coefficient for observations belonging to the provinces where the length 
of actions is greater than the median (Greene, 2003).
19 Simple t-tests allow us to test the 
significance of the coefficients of the interaction terms. Our analysis focuses on these 
coefficients. The coefficient of the variable of interest (size, tangible assets and age) not 
interacted with the dummies measures the effect of this variable on debt maturity when 
justice is highly efficient, i.e. the length is in its first quartile. 
In this part of the paper, we estimate only a panel random-effects model even when 
using log-odds, as we need to retain some cross-section variability because our indicator of 
the efficiency of justice does not vary with time. Further, even if we had a time-varying 
indicator of the efficiency of justice, we argue that for the lender the problem of evaluating 
two firms with different asymmetric information (proxied by firm characteristics) living in 
areas with different values for the efficiency of justice (cross-section variability) is more 
important than that of evaluating the same firm with different degrees of asymmetric 
information in different periods of its life, characterised by a changing level of the efficiency 
of justice in the same province (time-series variability, the only captured by panel fixed-
effects estimators).   
Nonetheless, the results obtained with a random-effects panel model are checked using 
cross-section estimations, i.e. estimations based on firm-specific means calculated by 
                                                            
19 For example, considering the following equation  µ δ β δ β β β + + + + = 2 2 4 2 1 3 2 2 1 X X X y , where 
the dummy   1 1 = δ  when the length of actions is greater than the first quartile and lower than the median, 
1 2 = δ  when the length of actions is over the median, and   2 X  is a variable for which we want to test the 
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where   2 β is the coefficient of the variable  2 X  for the observations belonging to the first quartile of the 
length of actions,  3 2 β β + is the coefficient for firms belonging to the second quartile, and    4 2 β β +  applies 
to firms for which the length is over the median.  22 
averaging firm data over years; this avoids serial correlations of the error terms implicit in 
the panel estimation.  
5. The data and the variables used in the estimation 
In estimating the model specified in Section 2 and in carrying out the test in Section 3 
we use a dataset made up of industrial firms from the Company Accounts Database (CAD - 
Centrale dei Bilanci), covering an eight-year period (1993 – 2000). Data on firms’ balance 
sheets, which are reclassified to ensure cross-sectional comparability, have been collected 
since 1982 from a consortium of banks; the sample is not randomly drawn as firms enter 
only if they borrow from one of the banks in the consortium. Since 1993 the Company 
Accounts Database has included some smaller companies from another dataset managed by 
the Chambers of Commerce (Cerved) and is less biased towards large-size firms.
20 Roughly, 
the balance sheets of more than 20,000 industrial companies are included in the dataset each 
year.  
We drop from the dataset some outliers in order to reduce their impact on the results. 
All the firm-year observations for which some variables used in the estimation are less than 
the 1
st percentile or above the 99
th percentile are deleted. We also drop firm-year 
observations for which age turns out to be wrong and for firms involved in mergers and 
acquisitions.  
Table 3 contains a list of all the variables used in the estimation. In the following part 
of the section we dwell on the measures for judicial efficiency and the firm score used in the 
paper; we also present some descriptive statistics.  
5.1 The measure for judicial efficiency and for the risk of the firm  
Using the province where the firm is located, we include in the dataset an indicator of 
the efficiency of justice, the length of first-degree civil actions measured at a provincial level 
                                                            
20 In 2002, non-financial firms surveyed in the CAD sample (more than 30,000) accounted for 40 per cent 
of the value added of the whole sector of non-financial firms, based on Institutional Accounts by the National 
Institute of Statistics.   23 
(95 provinces). This measure is provided by the National Institute of Statistics; it is well 
correlated with other traditional measures of the efficiency of justice, such as the backlog of 
pending civil actions (Figure 1; Bianco and Giacomelli, 2004; Bianco, Jappelli and Pagano, 
2004 ).
21  
Our preferred measure of the risk of firms is the score indicator computed by the 
Company Accounts Database using a discriminant analysis. Firms are classified into four 
categories: the first includes safe firms (score=1,2), the second solvent firms (score=3,4), the 
third and the fourth categories vulnerable firms (score=5,6) and risky firms (7,8,9) 
respectively. This variable is interesting as it is supposed to capture the quality of the firms 
in a very stylised way; further, it is released around 15 months after the period it refers to. 
We therefore use its contemporaneous value in the estimation. In the paper we also consider 
the return volatility of the firm as a classical measure of the firm’s risk. We use the firm’s 
standard deviation of the operating income rate of growth, an indicator that cannot be 
directly affected by the firms’ debt level; this variable is calculated over the period 1993-
2000 and does not change with time.  
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 2 we report debt maturity, defined as the share of firms’ long-term financial 
debts, i.e. debts that mature after one year, by quartiles of the main explanatory variables.
22  
Debt maturity appears to be strongly positively correlated with asset maturity, size, tangible 
assets and age and negatively linked to firm risk and leverage. Table 4 reports some statistics 
on the variables used in the estimations. In general, firms show strong cross-section 
variability in their relevant characteristics. They also face quite different degrees of the 
efficiency of justice: the mean and the median value of the length of first-degree civil actions 
                                                            
21 The correlation coefficient considering the 27 Italian districts is positive and equal to 0.6. Previous 
estimates based on data referring to 27 Italian districts, rather than 95 provinces, showed that results using 
backlogs were quite similar to those obtained with the length of civil actions. 
22 Recent empirical papers have generally analysed maturity rather than duration. Some authors have tested 
maturity of new issues. However, in other studies it is assumed that firms follow a continuous optimal policy, 
resulting in a capital structure that reflects their preferred maturity. One can then test the theory by regressing a 
measure of debt maturity against different characteristics of firms (Ravid, 1996).   24 
is more than 3 years, while in the best province it is 2 years and in the worst roughly 6 years 
(Table 4 and Figure 2). 
6. The results for the baseline estimation of debt maturity  
In this paragraph we focus our attention on the baseline estimation for debt maturity of 
Italian industrial companies. In Table 5 the results obtained with both the estimation in log-
odds (panel GLS) and Tobit model are reported. The results we got with the two types of 
estimations are very similar (first and second columns); this is true also from an economic 
point of view.
 23 
As in most other studies, we find that controlling for matching with asset maturity is an 
important aspect of debt maturity choice: the proxy measuring asset maturity is positively 
correlated with the incidence of long-term financial debt. Nonetheless, the economic impact 
of this variable is rather modest.  
The variables that are proxies for asymmetric information have an important 
explanatory power in the debt maturity equation. Tangible assets have a positive effect on 
debt maturity. The economic impact of this variable is quite important: moving from the 1
st 
to the 3
rd quartile of tangible assets, debt maturity increases by roughly 7 percentage points 
(14 p.p moving from the 10
th to 90
th percentiles). Size and age also matter with the expected 
sign. Long-term debts have a higher incidence for larger and older firms. The economic 
effect of firm size is such that, moving from the 1
st to the 3
rd quartile of this variable, debt 
maturity increases by more than 4 percentage points (9 p.p moving from the 10
th to the 90
th 
percentiles). As for firm age, the linear term has a positive coefficient, while the squared 
term has a negative coefficient, revealing an inverted U-shape relationship. This relationship 
is actually positive up to the age of 40 years (the 90
th percentile) and then becomes negative; 
                                                            
23 The following calculations of the economic impact are obtained using Tobit estimations and putting all 
the other explanatory variables, but the one considered, at their mean values for the sample used in the panel 
estimation. With regression using log-odds of the dependent variable, we cannot directly estimate the 
conditional expectation of the dependent variable without further assumptions. Simulations based on the 
methodology proposed by Duan (1983) show an even stronger economic impact for the variables such as size, 
tangible assets, age and, in particular, leverage.   25 
however, moving from the 1
st to the 3
rd quartile of age, debt maturity increases by only 1 
percentage point. 
Considering the prediction related to firm risk, the coefficient of the return volatility, a 
classical measure of firm risk, has a negative sign; when we insert the squared term of the 
return volatility, we still find that the relationship between debt maturity and risk is negative 
for the most important part of the risk distribution. The indicator used is the standard 
deviation of the operating income growth rate measured over the period under analysis; a 
similar result is obtained using the standard deviation of the first difference of earnings 
before interests and taxes, scaled by total assets (Johnson, 2003). However, the economic 
impact of this variable is quite modest: moving from the 1
st to the 3
rd quartile of return 
volatility, debt maturity decreases by only 0.2 points; important changes occur only in the 
upper tail of the distribution (beyond the 95
th percentile). 
Another valuable indicator of firm risk is the score measured by CAD using a 
discriminant analysis. This is a more complete measure of firm risk, which changes over 
time. Unfortunately, it is highly correlated with leverage (0.80); for this reason we prefer to 
run separate estimations (in third and fourth columns of Table 5). We do not actually find 
evidence of a non-monotonic relationship, as predicted by Diamond (1991a). Our result is 
that debt-maturity is always decreasing as far as firm risk is increasing, actually reaching a 
minimum level at the maximum level of the score. The economic impact of the score is 
important: moving from the 1
st (score equal to 4) to the 3
rd quartile (score equal to 6) of the 
score, debt maturity decreases by 4 percentage points. Importantly, as score and leverage are 
highly correlated at the firm level, we also try a similar estimation dropping leverage from 
the debt maturity equation; we obtain similar results (Table 5, fourth column).
24  
                                                            
24 Diamond says that empirical studies of debt maturity will measure a mixture of the presence of short-term 
debt for low-risk and high-risk firms. This could make inference complicated. One way around this would be to 
use short-term bank debt as a proxy for the lower-rated borrowers, who are forced to choose short-term debt, 
and directly placed commercial paper as the proxy for the higher-rated borrowers, who choose short-term debt. 
In Italy the latter group of borrowers is not large and, for the median firm, bank debts account for more than 95 
per cent of financial debts (the mean value is around 80 per cent). The shortage of an instrument like 
commercial paper could help to explain why in Italy we just observe a monotonic relationship between debt 
maturity and firm risk; debt maturity is a downward sloping function of firm risk as low-risk firms cannot rely 
on short-term directly placed debt, while short-term bank debt is often not cheaper than long-term debt.  26 
Considering the prediction regarding agency costs, our evidence does not seem to 
support Myers’s explanation (1977). The proxy used for opportunities of growth, the growth 
of sales measured at sector level between t and t+1 (we use an indicator at sector level as this 
variable is potentially endogenous at firm level), does not significantly influence debt 
maturity. Similar results are obtained using the growth of value added, always measured at a 
sector level between t and t+1. Further, the evidence is analogous using the future growth of 
sales at firm level, although this variable can be potentially endogenous. We also include the 
ratio of research and development on sales, on the basis that more innovative firms can have 
greater growth opportunities, and therefore managers can have more discretion in choosing 
investments; in this case a negative relationship arises, though not significantly different 
from zero. Therefore, theories based on the conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
creditors do not find support in the Italian data. This result is different from that in Barclay 
and Smith (1995) and Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003), who find an inverse relationship 
between growth opportunities and debt maturity. Demand factors, which are at the origin of 
these explanations, do not seem to have important explanatory power for Italian industrial 
firms.  
As for the impact of firm leverage (predicted value
25) on debt maturity, we find that 
leverage is negatively linked to debt maturity; the economic impact is around 1 percentage 
point moving from the 1
st to the 3
rd quartile of leverage (3 p.p moving from the 10
 th to the 
90
th percentile). This evidence is not consistent with the results found in other papers, where 
leverage is positively correlated with debt maturity for US firms (Mauer and Stohs, 1996), 
and for European firms when the main countries are pooled together (Giannetti, 2000). 
However, Enria (1999) finds a negative relationship for selected European countries such as 
Austria, Germany and Italy. A positive relationship is likely to reflect the prevalence of a 
demand effect: an increasing leverage raises the liquidity risk and induces firms to ask for 
more long-term debt (Diamond, 1991a). In Italy, by contrast, supply considerations seem to 
dominate: Italian lenders are likely to consider firms with more leverage as riskier and they 
                                                            
25 The pseudo R squared of the first-stage leverage equation in the Tobit estimation is 0.22.    27 
prefer to shorten their debts for stricter monitoring; the cumulative effect is an increase in the 
liquidity risk for Italian firms.
26  
All the results commented in this section, reported in Table 5, refer to a panel random-
effects model. However, they hold when a panel fixed-effects, exploiting only time-series 
variability, is estimated.
27 Summing up, we can conclude that, after controlling for asset 
maturity, Italian firms’ debt maturity is positively influenced by firm size, tangible assets 
and age: a decrease in the asymmetric information proxies has a positive influence on debt 
maturity, reflecting the importance of a supply effect. Further, for the whole risk distribution, 
debt maturity is negatively linked to risk indicators, such as the score and firm return 
volatility; in the Diamond framework (1991a) this result reflects the prevalence of a supply 
effect. No clear evidence emerges that growth opportunities and agency costs influence debt 
maturity, according to which firms should prefer (i.e. demand effect) short-term debt to 
reduce the conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors. Finally, debt maturity is 
negatively related to leverage, a result that can be explained on the grounds that lenders 
prefer to shorten debt maturity to highly leveraged firms, as they are riskier. 
Overall, supply considerations seem to dominate in determining the equilibrium value 
of debt maturity.  
7. The results of the test based on legal enforcement  
In this section, we present the results of the test explained in Section 3, aimed at 
improving our understanding of the importance of a supply explanation in determining the 
equilibrium value of debt maturity. For the sake of space, we only report the results obtained 
using the dependent variable in log-odds and a panel random-effect estimator (GLS); similar 
                                                            
26 It is worth saying that Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003) also find a negative relationship between leverage 
and debt maturity in the debt maturity equation. However, they interpret this evidence on the basis of the 
agency cost theory. They argue leverage and debt maturity are not strategic complements, but substitutes in 
addressing the under-investment problem. In other words, when leverage increases, the conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and creditors matter more; the firm can reduce these conflicts by using less long-term 
debt. 
27 Hausman test, which compares an estimator that is known to be consistent (fixed-effects – footnote 17) 
with an estimator that is efficient (random-effects), rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the two 
estimators are similar.    28 
evidence is found when using a Tobit panel random-effect estimator. All the results 
commented in this section hold when we rely on a cross-section estimation, averaging the 
firm values over time (i.e. between estimation). This regression on a cross-section eliminates 
the problem of serially correlated errors, though not controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity; it preserves the dispersion across firms, but does not exploit any time-series 
variation in the observations.   
First, we consider the results of the test in (2) when the proxies of asymmetric 
information (size, tangible assets and age) are interacted with the continuous value of the 
efficiency of justice (Table 6); the heads of the columns refer to the variable of interest, 
which is included in the interaction term: for example, in the first column the results 
obtained interacting size are shown. As argued in Section 3, these proxies of asymmetric 
information influence debt maturity for supply reasons, i.e. when, for example, either size or 
age increases, asymmetric information fades, monitoring becomes less important and lenders 
are willing to increase debt maturity. We argue that when the justice is less efficient, 
asymmetric information problems should be more pervasive for lenders. We therefore expect 
that the impact of our proxies of asymmetric information on debt maturity is stronger when 
justice is less efficient.  
This is actually the evidence in Table 6, as the coefficients of the interaction terms (the 
second cross partial derivative in 2) have a positive sign for size, tangible assets and age. 
Therefore, as long as the length of first-degree civil actions increases, we find that the 
positive slopes (the first derivatives) for size, tangible assets and age become steeper. 
Consequently, as the efficiency of justice worsens, firm size, tangible assets and age become 
more important in influencing debt maturity. The supply explanation is therefore confirmed. 
We also test the robustness of the results by running a regression with interaction terms 
using dummies for legal enforcement, rather than a continuous variable. We find the positive 
correlation between debt maturity and firms’ size and tangible assets (Table 7, first and 
second columns) to increase where legal enforcement is worse: the coefficients of the 
interaction terms are positive and significant. It seems, therefore, that when enforcement 
costs are higher, lenders are more selective and attach more weight to firm size and tangible 
assets in choosing debt maturity. The changing importance of tangible assets is also evident 
for firms facing an initial deterioration in the efficiency of justice (from the 1
st quartile to the  29 
median value), while size is more relevant only when the length of first-degree civil actions 
is greater than the median value. Mixed results are found for the relationships with age. The 
coefficients of this variable seem to be reinforced in its positive sign when the inefficiency 
of justice is greater (Table 7, third column), though the positive coefficient of the interaction 
term is imprecisely estimated. To verify the results concerning the impact of enforcement 
costs, we include in the equation all the interaction terms at the same time and obtain similar 
results: the influence of firm size and tangible assets is greater for firms facing a higher 
degree of inefficiency of justice (Table 8, first column). 
To summarise, an increase in size, tangible assets and age, which reduces information 
asymmetries, has a positive impact on debt maturity; this effect is stronger when the quality 
of justice is lower, i.e. when information asymmetries matter more. Overall, as the test in (2) 
shows in general a positive sign, we can conclude that a supply explanation of the 
determinants of debt maturity is confirmed.     
8. Robustness exercises  
In this section we carry out some exercises to assess the robustness of the results 
previously commented; specifically we aim at verifying that the results are not determined 
by the particular choices of the sample, variables and specifications.  
As for the baseline estimation, we first verify the sensitivity of the results to the 
simultaneous equation framework. We estimate the debt maturity equation in a single 
equation framework, i.e. we use a reduced form equation with only exogenous variables on 
the right-hand side and therefore excluding leverage from the estimation. The main results 
hold (Table 8, second column). The aim is to check if previous results were affected by 
multicollinearity problems that can arise in the two-stage framework. Actually, in the 
maturity equation the correlations between the predicted leverage and the other explanatory 
variables are not very high; this explains why multicollinearity problems do not affect the 
main results.  
Coming back to the simultaneous equation framework, we try different instruments for 
leverage. We first rely only on the non-debt tax shield (depreciation on total assets); then, we 
use a proxy for the non-debt tax shield and profits measured by return on equity rather than  30 
return on assets; finally, we use profits measured by the return on assets and non-debt tax 
shield proxied by depreciation normalised on operating income rather on total assets. All the 
previous results hold.   
Considering the correlation between explanatory variables in the baseline estimation, 
the highest is between the asset maturity and tangible assets (0.45). Omitting asset maturity, 
the effect of tangible assets is unchanged. We also try to measure asset maturity in an 
alternative way, i.e. as a ratio between tangible and intangible assets on total assets (fixed 
assets); the variable capturing the tangibility of the assets is the ratio between tangible and 
fixed assets (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). The results are unaffected.  
Belonging to a business group can be seen as another mechanism for mitigation of 
information asymmetries, possibly affecting the maturity structure of debt. In other words, 
belonging to a group is a mechanism whereby firm characteristics reflecting the quality of 
the firm might become less important in influencing debt maturity. Interacting size, tangible 
assets and age with a dummy equal to 1 when the firm belongs to a group, the evidence is 
that all the three variables actually matter less in the debt-maturity equation for firms in a 
group. This confirms the role of these three variables as proxies of information asymmetries.  
We also verify the results using a balanced panel, i.e. a sample of firms that are present 
in a row for 6 years. All the results obtained in the baseline estimation hold. As for the 
coefficients of the interaction terms with the efficiency of justice measured as a continuous 
variable (Table 6), we find that size and age matter more where the efficiency of justice 
decreases.  
As another way of testing the robustness of the results, we also split the sample into 
three sub-samples,  according to the length of first-degree civil actions: below the first 
quartile, between the first quartile and the median, over the median. Compared with using 
interactions terms, where only the coefficients of the interacted variables are entitled to 
change, in this case all the variables are allowed to have different coefficients in the sub-
samples. We then use a Wald test to verify whether the coefficients of the variables we are  31 
interested in are different.
28 Unreported results reveal evidence analogous to that presented 
in Tables 6 and 7.  
Further, we repeat the same estimations considering the provinces where the firms 
operate, rather than those where they are located: similar results are obtained.  
Finally, we try to assess another strand of theory according to which firms, i.e. the 
demand side, should prefer short-term debt. Diamond predicts (1991a) that when a firm 
foresees an improvement in its quality, it asks for more short-term debt in order to obtain 
rapidly some benefits in payment terms. We use the score, assuming that at time t firms have 
already some clues for measuring their risk rating, which will be released to banks by CAD 
only after 15 months. We rely on a fixed-effect panel estimation, which should capture only 
time-series variability and therefore should be best suited to measure this effect. As before, 
we drop leverage because of its high correlation with score. We find that the Diamond 
prediction is not supported by data for Italian firms: the fixed-effect estimation shows that as 
long as firm risk decreases (i.e. a firm foresees an improvement in its quality), debt maturity 
increases rather than diminishes (Table 8, third column). This evidence reinforces the idea 
that debt maturity choice is more likely to be driven by supply-side than demand-side 
motivations.  
9. Concluding remarks 
After controlling for asset maturity, the equilibrium share of debt maturity for Italian 
firms is positively influenced by their size, tangible assets and age. This evidence is partly in 
line with that concerning other countries. We interpret it as whether a decrease in 
asymmetric information problems reduces the need for monitoring and induces lenders to 
grant more long-term debt. Further,  we do not find any evidence of a non monotonic 
relationship between debt maturity and firm risk as predicted in Diamond: for Italian firms 
debt maturity essentially decreases when firm risk increases, reflecting the importance of a 
supply explanation. Unlike firms in some other countries, debt maturity is inversely 
correlated with leverage, another clue to the importance of lenders’ decisions in determining 
                                                            
28 This Wald test is valid whether or not the variance of the samples is the same; it is based on the 
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debt maturity. Finally, conflicts of interests between shareholders and creditors, which 
should induce firms (i.e. the demand side of the market) to ask for short-term debt, seem to 
have no effect on firm debt maturity choice.  
It seems, therefore, that the quality of the firm as perceived by the lender and the 
corresponding monitoring problem are very important in determining the equilibrium result 
for debt maturity. On the contrary, the explanations that the theory puts forward to explain 
debt maturity on the demand side, i.e. the positive relationship between debt maturity and 
risk-rating as stated in the Diamond model (1991a) and the preference for short-term debt to 
reduce under-investment problems for firms with high growth opportunities, do not seem to 
have enough explanatory power, at least as far as Italian industrial firms are concerned. 
Lenders, or the supply-side of the market, are likely to have strong bargaining power in 
choosing the maturity of financial debt to address informational problems (Ortiz-Molina and 
Penas, 2005; Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 1997). In other words, lenders are likely to exert 
control over borrowers by choosing shorter maturities when informational asymmetries and 
default risk are more important. 
The importance of the supply side of the market in determining firm debt maturity is 
confirmed when we analyse the impact of legal enforcement. Where judicial efficiency is 
worsen, i.e. the enforcement costs of the loan contract are higher, the positive impact of firm 
size, tangible assets and age on debt maturity increases. The interpretation we offer is that 
lenders assign more weight to these proxies of asymmetric information when asymmetric 
information has more pervasive effect, i.e. where it is more difficult to enforce the loan 
contract and the lender has less probability of recovering the loan in the case of default. In 
our view, these results support a supply explanation of debt maturity in Italy. 
Overall, this paper underlines an important task for debt maturity in addressing 
lenders’ information and control problems.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
assumption of independent samples (Greene, 2003).   
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   Table 1 
  A COMPARISON OF LIABILITY COMPOSITION FOR    
NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES  
               (as a percentage of GDP - 2000)    
 
 
       
  Loans from resident 
Monetary Financial 
Institutions  
of which long- 
term (> 1 year) 
Securities other than 
shares  
of which long-term 
(> 1 year) 
       
      
France    35.9 24.9 17.6 10.3 
Germany   38.6  27.4  2.6  1.9 
Greece 34.4  10.8  0.0  0.0 
Ireland 33.5  18.3  -  - 
Italy 41.6  17.5  2.0  1.5 
Spain 43.1  28.0  3.5  3.0 
Euro area   42.5  27.2  7.6  5.1 
 
Report on Financial Structure, European Central Bank (2002).  
   
Table 2 
ITALIAN FIRMS’ DEBT MATURITY ACCORDING TO SOME RELEVANT FIRM 
CHARACTERISTICS  
 
      
  Size   Tangible assets   Age 
    
      
1
st quartile   0.246 [0.257] (0.146) 
No. firms:17,440 
0.185 [0.219] (0.062)  
No. firms:17,133 
0.278 [0.329] (0.197)  
No. firms:17,145 
2
st quartile   0.292 [0.289] (0.223) 
No. firms:17,207 
0.282 [0.304] (0.210) 
No. firms:17,117 
0.302 [0.331] (0.241) 
No. firms:19,403 
3
st quartile   0.324 [0.316] (0.271) 
No. firms:16,763 
0.340 [0.346] (0.292) 
No. firms:17,121 
0.309 [0.330] (0.253) 
No. firms:15,575 
4
 st quartile   0.352 [0.351] (0.309) 
No. firms:17,071 
0.405 [0.428] (0.387) 
No. firms:17,110 
0.325 [0.319] (0.271) 
No. firms:16,358 
      
      
  Asset maturity  Opportunities for growth  Leverage 
    
      
1
st quartile   0.202 [0.209] (0.059)  
No. firms:17,121 
0.296 [0.324] (0.234)  
No. firms:17,152 
0.369 [0.438] (0.289)  
No.  firms:17,122 
2
st quartile   0.298 [0.296] (0.224) 
No. firms:17,120 
0.309 [0.323] (0.251) 
No. firms:17,113 
0.323 [0.359] (0.281) 
No. firms:17,121 
3
st quartile   0.339 [0.344] (0.290) 
No. firms:17,120 
0.311 [0.335] (0.253) 
No. firms:17,158 
0.284 [0.331] (0.251) 
No. firms:17,129 
4
 st quartile   0.372 [0.393] (0.346) 
No. firms:17,120 
0.294 [0.325] (0.228) 
No. firms:17,058 
0.236 [0.276] (0.194) 
No. firms:17,109 
      
      
  Return volatility  Score  Area (1,2) 
    
      
1
st quartile /North-West   0.342 [0.364] (0.291)  
No. firms:17,128 
0.361 [0.398] (0.311)  
No. firms:34,071 
0.307 [0.325] (0.245)  
No. firms:30,499 
2
st quartile /North-East  0.301 [0.331] (0.244) 
No. firms:17,113 
0.284 [0.326] (0.249)  
No. firms:12,275 
0.303 [0.336] (0.247) 
No. firms:21,430  
3
st quartile/Centre    0.290 [0.321] (0.220) 
No. firms:17,123 
0.219 [0.267] (0.175)  
No. firms:10,511 
0.274 [0.302] (0.199) 
No. firms:11,038  
4
 st quartile/South    0.278 [0.295] (0.209) 
No. firms:17,117 
0.227 [0.265] (0.185)  
No. firms:11,517 
0.338 [0.344] (0.284) 
No. firms:5,514  
      
 
Company Accounts Database, industrial firms. Debt maturity is the ratio of long-term financial debts (maturing 
after one year) to total debts. Unweighted average [aggregate ratios or weighted average] (median values) for 
1993-2000 years. All the statistics are calculated for the observations used in the panel estimation.  (1) Using 
the province where the firm is located; the evidence is similar considering the province where the firm operates. 
(2) Areas are reported in the first column.  
   
Table 3 
 
THE VARIABLES USED IN THE ESTIMATION  
 
    
 Description  Source 
    
Debt maturity  The ratio of long-term financial debt (maturing after 1  
year and using residual maturity) to total financial debt.  
CAD 
Size  The logarithm of the number of employees.  
If this number is missing, we estimate it using labour  
costs and average labour cost per head in the firm’s  
industry (four-digit figures). 
CAD 
Tangible assets  The ratio of net equipment and gross plant to total assets.  CAD 
Asset maturity   The maturity of current assets is measured as current assets  
divided by the value of goods sold, while the maturity of net  
property, plant and equipment is obtained dividing this amount  
by depreciation; these two ratios are weighted by the relative size  
of current assets and net property, plant and equipment. 
CAD 
Age  The age of the firm, equal to the difference between the year  
to which the data refer and the date of birth. 
CAD 
Return volatility  The firm’s standard deviation of the operating income growth 
 rate, an indicator that cannot be directly affected by the firm’s 
debts. This variable is calculated over the period 1993-2000 and 
does not change with time. 
CAD 
Opportunities for growth   The growth rate of sales (or value added) between t and t+1  
at sector level (four-digit figure) 
CAD 
Leverage  The ratio of the book value of financial debt (short and  
long-term) to the book value of equity and financial 
debts. 
CAD 
Score   Indicator of the firm risk profile computed using discriminant 
analysis. CAD classifies firms in four categories: the first  
includes safe firms (score=1,2), the second includes solvent 
firms (score=3,4), the third and the fourth categories include 
vulnerable firms (score=5,6) and risky firms (score=7,8,9). 
CAD 
Profits  The ratio of earnings before interests and taxes to total  
assets (return on assets). We use earnings before interests to  
obtain a profitability indicator that is the least influenced by  
leverage. 
CAD 
Non-debt tax shields   The ratio of depreciations of tangible and intangible assets  
to total assets   
CAD 
Judicial efficiency  The length of first-degree civil actions. Average value at 
provincial level (95 provinces), measured weighting length by  
the number of actions and for the years 1995-1998 (tribunali  
and preture). The length is the interval between the date of the  
initial filing and that of the judgement in civil actions.   
National Institute  





SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE VARIABLES USED IN THE ESTIMATION  
 







I Quartile  
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No. of non 
missing 
observations 
      
       





































































Company Accounts Database, industrial firms. Data on judicial efficiency are provided by the National 
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). All the statistics are calculated for the observations used in the panel estimation 
and  over  the  period  1993-2000.  Mean  are  unweighted  averages  over  the  whole  period  under  analysis.             
(1) Number of employees. (2) Measured on 95 Italian provinces.   
Table 5 
THE BASELINE ESTIMATION OF DEBT MATURITY 
(panel estimation with random effects for 1993-2000) 
 
        
  GLS estimation 
log-odds 
Tobit estimation   GLS estimation 
    log-odds  
   With score  
 
GLS estimation  
      log-odds  
With score & 
without leverage  
        
        
Age   0.026 (5.20)  0.002 (5.19)  0.047 (4.67)  0.030 (6.20) 
Age squared   -0.000 (-5.24)  -0.000 (-6.82)  -0.000 (-5.6)  -0.000 (-5.7) 
Size   0.666 (21.1)  0.053 (21.1)  0.654 (18.4)  0.674 (21.6) 
Asset maturity  0.012 (2.78)  0.001 (1.87)  0.014 (2.79)  0.011 (2.62) 
Tangible assets   6.465 (33.5)  0.553 (37.9)  5.847 (16.4)  6.324 (33.1) 
Opportunities for growth    -0.005 (-0.05)  -0.003 (-0.38)  0.311 (1.73)  0.023 (0.24) 
Return volatility  -0.035 (-3.69)  -0.003 (-2.95)  -0.018 (-1.38)  -0.035 (-3.83) 
Leverage (predicted)  -0.373 (-5.25)  -0.176 (-10.3)  3.270 (1.98)   
North   -0.039 (-0.31)  -0.001 (-0.13)  -1.175 (-2.29)  -0.194 (-1.66) 
Centre   -0.158 (-1.11)  -0.012 (-1.08)  -1.159 (-2.52)  -0.303 (-2.21) 
Score       -3.856 (-2.06)  -0.152 (-2.77) 
Score squared      0.199 (1.98)  0.001 (0.19) 
Constant   -7.003(-29.0)  -0.030 (-1.52)  6.207 (0.93)  -6.276 (-23.1) 
        
        
        
No. observations   68,481  68,481  68,371  68,371 
No. groups   14,899  14,899  14,884  14,884 
R
2 (overall) 
    0.0648    0.0818  0.0966 
No. of left-censored obs.     15,762     
No. of right –censored obs.    1,567     
Wald test all the regressors 
=0 (excluding constant) – 
p.value 
 0.000     
LR Test (panel variance=0) 
–p.value  
 0.000     
        
 
The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term financial debt to all financial debt and has been 
transformed into log-odds when using GLS; leverage is also transformed into log-odds when using GLS; 
test t are in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged one period, excluding the opportunity for 
growth proxy, which is measured in t+1, and the return variability, which is fixed during the sample period. 
All the estimations contain time and industry dummies. The instruments for leverage are non-debt tax 
shields and profits, plus all the other exogenous variables used in the estimation of the maturity equations. 
When using GLS log-odds, similar results are obtained with fixed-effects panel estimations. With GLS log- 






THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY USING A CONTINUOUS VARIABLE 
 (GLS panel with random effects for 1993-2000) 
 
      
  Size  Tangible assets  Age  
     
      
Age   0.027 (5.25)  0.026 (5.23)  0.004 (0.39) 
Age squared   -0.000 (-5.24)  -0.000 (-5.23)  -0.000 (-5.13) 
Size   0.522 (8.36)  0.666 (21.1)  0.666 (21.1) 
Asset maturity   0.012 (2.79)  0.012 (2.75)  0.013 (2.81) 
Tangible assets   6.457 (33.4)  4.820 (6.35)  6.456 (33.4) 
Opportunities for growth    -0.004 (-0.04)  -0.004 (-0.04)  -0.004 (-0.05) 
Return volatility  -0.035 (-3.69)  -0.035 (-3.69)  -0.035 (-3.68) 
Leverage (predicted)  -0.371 (-5.23)  -0.371 (-5.23)  -0.373 (-5.25) 
North   0.056 (0.43)  0.037 (0.29)  0.030 (0.24) 
Centre   -0.121 (-0.85)  -0.112 (-0.82)  -0.131 (-0.92) 
Constant   -7.712 (-32.1)  -7.067 (-29.1)  -7.059 (-29.1) 
      
JE*Size 0.044  (2.69)     
JE*Tangible assets    0.498 (2.24)   
JE*Age       0.007 (2.53) 
      
      
No. observations   68,481  68,481  68,481 
No. groups   14,899  14,899  14,899 
R
2 (overall)  0.0653  0.0651  0.0651 
      
 
The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term financial debt to all financial debt and has been 
transformed into log-odds; leverage is also transformed into log-odds; test t are in parentheses. The 
independent variables are lagged one period, excluding the opportunity for growth, which is measured in 
t+1 and the return variability, which is fixed during the sample period. All the estimations contain time 
and industry dummies. The instruments for leverage are non-debt tax shields and profits, plus all the other 
exogenous variables used in the estimation of the maturity equations; the standard errors are corrected for 






   
Table 7 
THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY USING DUMMIES 
 (GLS panel with random effects for 1993-2000) 
 
      
  Size  Tangible assets  Age  
     
      
Age   0.026 (5.20)  0.026 (5.19)  0.025 (4.21) 
Age squared   -0.000 (-5.18)  -0.000 (-5.21)  -0.000 (-5.02) 
Size   0.606 (10.4)  0.667 (21.1)  0.666 (21.1) 
Asset maturity   0.013 (2.82)  0.012 (2.74)  0.013 (2.83) 
Tangible assets   6.464 (33.5)  5.547 (15.9)  6.465 (33.5) 
Opportunities for growth    -0.006 (-0.07)  -0.004 (-0.04)  -0.006 (-0.06) 
Return volatility  -0.035 (-3.72)  -0.035 (-3.69)  -0.035 (-3.70) 
Leverage (predicted)  -0.374 (-5.28)  -0.371 (-5.23)  -0.375 (-5.28) 
North   -0.030 (-0.23)  -0.020 (-0.15)  -0.027 (-0.21) 
Centre   -0.148 (-1.04)  -0.140 (-0.98)  -0.153 (-1.07) 
Jud. efficiency  (JE1)   0.043 (0.14)  0.338 (-2.78)  0.001 (0.01) 
Jud. efficiency (JE2)   -0.816 (-2.56)  -0.276 (-2.07)  -0.146 (-1.04) 
Constant   -6.736 (-20.8)  -7.429 (-28.9)  -6.968 (-26.7) 
      
JE1*Size -0.026  (-0.35)     
JE2*Size 0.202  (2.65)     
JE1*Tangible assets    1.266 (2.94)   
JE2*Tangible assets    1.207 (2.66)   
JE1*Age       -0.002 (-0.60) 
JE2*Age     0.007  (1.31) 
      
      
      
No. observations   68,481  68,481  68,481 
No. groups   14,899  14,899  14,899 
R
2 (overall)   0.0652  0.0653  0.0646 
      
 
The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term financial debt to all financial debt and has been 
transformed into log-odds; leverage is also transformed into log-odds; test t are in parentheses. The 
independent variables are lagged one period, excluding the opportunity for growth, which is measured 
in t+1 and the return variability, which is fixed during the sample period. All the estimations contain 
time and industry dummies. The instruments for leverage are non-debt tax shields and profits, plus all 
the other exogenous variables used in the estimation of the maturity equations; the standard errors are 
corrected for 2-stage estimation. JE1 is a dummy that is equal to 1 for the provinces where the length 
of first-degree civil actions is over the 1
st quartile and less than the median; JE2 is a dummy equal to 1 
for the provinces where the length of first-degree civil actions is over the median value. 
  
Table 8 
SOME ROBUSTNESS EXERCISES  
(GLS panel with random effects for 1993-2000)  
 
      






Including firm score & 
excluding leverage  
fixed-effect estimator 
      
      
Age   0.025 (4.27)  0.035 (7.21)  0.185 (12.4) 
Age squared   -0.000 (-4.98)  -0.000 (-6.41)  -0.001 (-4.46) 
Size   0.620 (10.5)  0.691 (22.2)  0.446 (6.73) 
Asset maturity  0.013 (2.82)  0.074 (1.72)  0.015 (3.19) 
Tangible assets   5.569 (15.9)  6.340 (33.2)  4.110 (15.2) 
Opportunities for 
growth   
-0.005 (-0.06)  -0.009 (-0.10)  0.043 (0.45) 
Return volatility  -0.035 (-3.73)  -0.043 (-4.56)   
Leverage (predicted)   -0.373 (-5.26)     
Score     -0.251  (-3.82) 
Score squared      0.006 (0.93) 
North   -0.032 (-0.25)  -0.246 (-2.10)  -0.693 (-0.82) 
Centre   -0.145 (-1.02)  -0.364 (-2.66)  -0.879 (-0.99) 
Jud. efficiency  (JE1)   -0.143 (-0.45)     
Jud. efficiency (JE2)   -1.050 (-3.15)     
Constant   -6.588 (-20.0)  -7.009 (-29.1)  -8.415 (-8.18) 
      
JE1*Size -0.035  (-0.48)     
JE2*Size 0.176  (2.27)     
JE1*Tangible assets  1.277 (2.96)     
JE2*Tangible assets  1.110 (2.44)     
JE1*Age   -0.002 (-0.51)     
JE2*Age 0.005  (0.89)     
      
No. observations   68,481  68,481  68,371 
No. groups   14,899  14,899  14,884 
R
2 (overall)  0.0655  0.0961  0.0350 
      
 
The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term financial debt to all financial debt and has been 
transformed into log-odds; leverage is also transformed into log-odds; test t are in parentheses. The 
regressors are lagged one period, excluding the opportunity for growth, which is measured in t+1, 
the return variability, which is fixed during the sample period and the score, which is released with 
lags. All the estimations contain time and industry dummies. The instruments for leverage are non-
debt tax shields and profits, plus all the other exogenous variables used in the estimation of the 
maturity equations; the standard errors are corrected for 2-stage estimation. JE1 is a dummy that is 
equal to 1 for the provinces where the length of first-degree civil actions is over the 1
st quartile and 
less than the median; JE2 is a dummy equal to 1 for the provinces where the length of first-degree 
civil actions is over the median value.   
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JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY AMONG 95 ITALIAN PROVINCES 
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